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ABSTRACT 
This Article aims to provide one of the world’s first analyses of the 
North Korean food safety regime. Very rarely has this regime been a 
subject of discussion, as much attention has been diverted to food 
security issues. However, food safety remains a critical problem for the 
people. 
I will analyze North Korea’s food safety regime and the factors that 
create, influence, and develop food safety protections; it will 
subsequently discuss trends that illustrate how food safety standards 
are evolving in the country. 
In Part I, I introduce the concept of evolving food safety regimes. I 
draw upon certain theoretical underpinnings of this concept by 
defining regime and reviewing the causes of regulatory failure that 
ultimately follow changes in regimes. 
In Part II, I study the developments in North Korea’s food safety 
regime from a legal perspective, going beyond merely discussing 
political transformations. I discuss the developments in the country’s 
laws and regulations by touching upon different elements of the food 
safety regime separately. This is a rather novel study and I use this 
methodology to identify and distinguish different elements undergoing 
social progress separately. 
In Part III, I cautiously make predictions of changes in North 
Korea’s food safety regime. As a general phenomenon in the area of 
food law, naturally, a regime is not static. Decision-making procedures 
that comply with the law, introduction of transparent lawmaking 
processes, predictable implementation and enforcement of the law, and 
raising public awareness are all important tasks. While deification of 
the Kim family will most likely continue as a primary political priority, 
it is still likely that the government will delve into structural 
fragmentation problems, societal segmentation problems, and raise 
public participation in the near future as it continues to realize that a 
well-established and stable legal food safety regime is critical. It will 
be very difficult for the government to ignore when food safety 
accidents occur and people become increasingly aware of regulatory 
failures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
o some, North Korea’s food safety regime may appear to lie
somewhere between law and society.1 Many perceive a large
disconnect between the two worlds, and often these two do not even 
overlap.2 In fact, North Korea’s rule-of-man governance, in which an 
absolute ruler can exercise arbitrary power,3 might seem as though 
there is no law to begin with. In general, scholars have attempted to 
discuss and address this dislocation between worlds.4 Society is 
commonly interpreted as the “social experience” or the reality that 
people live in.5 It is about living the everyday life and facing societal 
consequences that come with it, either positive or negative. According 
to this perspective, society is often separate from the law, since law and 
its application are more or less “secondary bod[ies] of phenomena.”6 It 
is the normative standard that fails to define society as it exists.7 
Undoubtedly, food security issues have been the topic of debate 
when discussing food production. This, too, creates a common 
enthymeme that not much can be said about food safety regulations in 
North Korea. It is undeniably true that no dominant understanding of 
North Korea’s food safety regime exists. With increased information 
on North Korea now available,8 this Article recognizes law as a valid 
constituent of the food safety regime, explains the aspects of the regime 
that make it unique, and emphasizes that the regime is worth 
independent study. While there is almost no comprehensive legal study 
on this subject, any analysis must address two major factors that 
impede a researcher’s ability to fully understand North Korea’s food 
regime: (1) North Korea is one of the world’s most secluded nations,9 
1 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (1984). 
2 Patricia Goede, Essay, Law “Of Our Own Style”: The Evolution and Challenges of the 
North Korean Legal System, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265 (2003). 
3 Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 333 
(2008). 
4 Gordon, supra note 1, at 60. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See id. 
8 In South Korea, there has been significant growth in both the quality and quantity of 
research resources available on North Korea during the past two decades. For information 
on growing research resources, see ATSUHITO ISOZAKI, WILSON CTR., UNDERSTANDING 
THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME 3–4 (2017), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
ap_understandingthenorthkoreanregime.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HB9-R5J3]. 
9 See RALPH HASSIG & KONGDAN OH, THE HIDDEN PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA: 
EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE HERMIT KINGDOM (2009). 
T 
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and (2) its food safety regime continues to exist and evolve in living 
raw form. It is alive in that it is constantly changing and progressing as 
part of its “social experience”10 and serves as an excellent independent 
study case for a food law scholar. At the same time, the journey to 
understanding North Korea’s food safety casts light on important social 
progress implications. This Article will analyze North Korea’s food 
safety regime and the factors that create, influence, and develop food 
safety protections; it will subsequently discuss trends that illustrate 
how food safety standards are evolving in the country. 
Part I introduces the concept of evolving food safety regimes. It 
draws upon certain theoretical underpinnings of this concept by 
defining “regime” and reviewing the causes of regulatory failure that 
ultimately follow changes in regimes. Part II studies the developments 
in North Korea’s food safety regime from a legal perspective, going 
beyond merely discussing political transformations. Part II also 
discusses the developments in the country’s laws and regulations by 
touching upon different elements of the food safety regime separately. 
This is a rather novel study, and thus this methodology identifies and 
distinguishes different elements undergoing social progress separately. 
Part III cautiously predicts future changes in North Korea’s food safety 
regime. 
I 
EVOLVING FOOD SAFETY REGIMES 
Although there is no mathematical formula available to predict 
definite and certain changes in a food safety regime, it is possible to 
make informed predictions. This is partly because history repeats 
itself,11 and similar transformations have taken place in other parts of 
the world.12 For example, scholarship points out that although North 
Korea traces China’s experience in its legal reform, the two nations 
differ because North Korea’s speed of social progress is rather slow, 
and the North Korean government faces difficulty in shifting swiftly 
from a rule-of-man system to a rule-of-law system.13 This transition 
10 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 60. 
11 G.W. TROMPF, THE IDEA OF HISTORICAL RECURRENCE IN WESTERN THOUGHT 2–3 
(1979). 
12 In a sequel to this study, this author aims to do an analysis of North Korea’s food 
safety regime compared to China’s. 
13 Bukhan Bubeul Bonuen Banbup [How to Read North Korean Laws], S. KOR. 
MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION 47, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/board/file/bbs_000000000000 
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influences many aspects of the food safety regime, as explained later. 
This Article will discuss several factors that influence North Korea’s 
food safety regime: (1) constitutional amendments that indicate North 
Korea’s policy direction, (2) North Korea’s adopted ideologies, (3) 
North Korea’s political structure, (4) North Korea’s social structure, (5) 
state-led efforts to raise public awareness, and (6) grassroots activism. 
In North Korea, the food safety regime is built on a rule-of-man 
governance system. Building a food safety regime in the country is 
analogous to a young child with building blocks. The child plays with 
a few blocks and builds a tower. When the tower wobbles and falls to 
the ground, the child realizes the mistake it made with its last few 
blocks. The child then makes another attempt—this time with a fresh 
commitment to perhaps make it taller and more stable. Through trial 
and error, slight changes in the design of the structure may even take 
place. One potential problem exists in that the child can exercise 
discretionary creativity that may be short-lived. When the new 
structure it tries to build completely fails, the child notices it cannot 
achieve its intended goal with the old model, and the child’s 
envisioning of the tower design may even change drastically. 
In the real world, the child’s building blocks are the different 
elements that make up the food safety regime in a rule-of-man state. 
Albeit drastically simplified for analogy, this well encapsulates Kim 
Jong Un’s role in building the food safety regime. In a country like 
North Korea, where rules are made based on decision makers’ 
preferences and society operates on a rule-of-man system, 
understanding the food safety regime may heavily equate to 
understanding the person in charge. Perhaps this is why the North 
Korean food safety regime appears to exist somewhere between law 
and society. 
The discussion of constantly changing food safety regimes begins 
by defining what a “regime” means. Originally from the French term 
regimen, regime is understood as a system of both rules and principles 
in a subject area.14 Food safety “regime” then translates to the system 
of informal and formal rules and principles that pertain to a nation’s 
food safety. Constituents that make up a regime can include policies, 
regulations, rules, agencies, and related stakeholders and their related 
0001/19493/FILE_000000000013132/19493_201405141942384340;jsessionid=8SndzhkB
mAJMv2u4KHdGchn6.unikorea11 [https://perma.cc/YAU7-VZW3]. 
14 Regime, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/ 
regime [https://perma.cc/9J5W-YYJM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
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activities.15 Therefore, for the purpose of this Article, regime means the 
collection of laws, policies, rules, practices, and standards that define 
what is considered “safe for human consumption.”16 In a rule-of-man 
system, regimes may even reflect the values preferred by a small group 
of people or individuals.17 
Scholars use different concepts to interpret and explain a food safety 
regime. For example, Snyder calls each facet of a society that makes 
up a food safety regime a “world.”18 As part of his work on the food 
safety situation leading up to the melamine crisis in China, he identified 
three worlds: the “social field of transnational markets,” the “social 
field of domestic economic relations,” and “government, regulation 
and law.”19 This Article further proposes that in this regime, separate 
constituents undergo what Kuhn would call periods of “incremental” 
change.20 
One way to further understand regimes is to study the main causes 
behind major forces that drive changes in regimes. These changes can 
occur from loopholes in regulations, particularly in areas where the two 
worlds of law and society fail to overlap.21 For food safety regulations, 
inadequately designed regulations that are vague, ambiguous, or 
otherwise poorly drafted fail to regulate in conformity with the 
intended purpose. 
Existing scholarship attempts to spell out the causes of the 
regulatory failures in various food safety regimes but not in 
North Korea specifically. Grabosky provides various reasons for 
regulatory failure including “bad science,” “bad planning,” “defects of 
programme implementation,” and “bad politics.”22 Bernstein purports 
15 See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International 
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 141–45 (1996). 
16 Wim Verbeke, Lynn J. Frewer, Joachim Scholderer & Hubert F. De Brabander, Why 
Consumers Behave as They Do with Respect to Food Safety and Risk Information, 586 
ANALYTICA CHIMICA ACTA 2, 2–7 (2007). 
17 Ningxin Dong, The Rule of Law and Economic Development—A Case Study of China, 
14 (2017), http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/HKU2017-s/Archive/d25cfe13-9851-
4e87-b15a-36975f46f035.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WW3-E26A]. 
18 FRANCIS G. SNYDER, FOOD SAFETY LAW IN CHINA 9–99 (2015). 
19 Id. at 16, 40, 60. 
20 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 48 (1970). 
21 Gordon, supra note 1, at 60. 
22 Guanqi Zhou, The Regulatory Regime of Food Safety in China: A Systemic Not 
Accidental Failure 22 (May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Adelaide), 
https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/100197/2/02whole.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3T79-ZLUH] (quoting Peter N. Grabosky, Counterproductive Regulation, 
23 INT’L J. SOC. L. 347, 360 (1995)). 
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that, according to the “regulatory life cycle,” regulatory agencies 
develop relationships with those under their supervision and 
regulation.23 Vogul addresses “informal resolution of issues” and a 
“culture of consensus between regulators and the regulated.”24 Stigler 
proposes that regulation is often corrupt itself in that certain private and 
sectional interests exist within.25 Other scholars take a micro-political 
perspective; pertaining to the food safety regime in China, some have 
argued that loopholes in the regulations were due to risk assessment 
and management problems that curbed the incentive to regulate and 
control food safety risks.26 Again, no scholars have yet identified 
potential problems or engines behind changes in the North Korean food 
safety regime. This Article aims to start the discussion. 
As a general phenomenon in the area of food law, naturally, a regime 
is not static. Food safety regimes constantly change as they are subject 
to both external and internal forces. Social forces affect the 
philosophical and theoretical frameworks that serve as the acceptable 
boundaries for tolerance, expectation, and the understanding of food 
safety, which evolve as a society continues to develop. Reinterpreting 
theory into practice, paradigm shifts take place as new food safety 
concerns surface, raising unprecedented questions, challenges, and 
issues. The public is then more receptive to new and nuanced 
campaigns for safe food.27 
Using discussions and existing scholarship on regulatory failures 
and food safety regimes, an attempt should be made to understand and 
predict important changes in a framework where there is no rule-of-law 
system in place. This is not because North Korea’s food safety regime 
is unknown to the outside world. Rather, it is because understanding 
the internal dynamics will partially shed light on the largely 
23 Zhou, supra note 22, at 22 (quoting MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS 
BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955)). 
24 Zhou, supra note 22, at 22 (citing DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF 
REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
(1986)). 
25 Zhou, supra note 22, at 22 (citing George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–21 (1971)). 
26 See generally Shumei Chen, Sham or Shame: Rethinking the China’s Milk Powder 
Scandal from a Legal Perspective, 12 J. RISK RES. 725 (2009); Hon-Ming Lam et al., Food 
Supply and Food Safety Issues in China, 381 LANCET 2044 (2013). 
27 Qijun Jiang & Ying Zhu, Challenges for Enforcing Food Safety Law and Regulations 
in China: Case Studies of Government Agencies in the Shanghai Region, 18 ASIAN-PAC. L. 
& POL’Y J. 36, 38 (2016) (citing Sarah Biddulph et al., Rule of Law with Chinese 
Characteristics: The Role of Campaigns in Law Making, 34 L. & POL’Y 373 (2012)). 
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unanswered question of what a society’s transition into a rule-of-law 
system will mean to the broader universe of food safety. 
II 
NORTH KOREA’S FOOD SAFETY REGIME IN A 
RULE-OF-MAN SYSTEM 
In a state where the rule of law, in principle, has very weak 
foundational standing, the food safety regime in its raw form would be 
subject to all sorts of arbitrary and discretionary factors. As in the case 
of a young child with building blocks, different forms of “arbitrary 
creativity” come into play. This then implies that changes in the regime 
can take place arbitrarily by the will of a certain powerful group of 
people and can be paid for by wealth.28 Accordingly, such changes 
would be imposed based on a top-down model. 
While maintaining the cautious approach of refraining from making 
formalistic assumptions of the world with no rule of law, changes can 
be anticipated because even in a country that runs on a rule of 
man, legal reforms are a very strong hint to changes in the leader’s 
policies and preferences. While it is challenging to predict such 
changes, China’s recent experience evolving its rule-of-man system to 
a comprehensive regulatory regime serves as a comparison and flags 
potential developments that North Korea may experience. 
A. Constitutional Reforms Made in Parallel with Sociopolitical
Changes in North Korea 
Though North Korea’s power concentration limits the ability to 
administer laws and thus predict changes, amendments to North 
Korea’s Constitution serve as a window into the leadership’s policy 
preferences. This manifests itself by the changes that have taken place 
in parallel with sociopolitical changes in the country. While the North 
Korean Constitution stipulates that the law is the “basic instrument for 
State administration,”29 North Korea is still a State where political 
power practically establishes the law in both its design and 
implementation.30 In its design, the law in North Korea is consciously 
limited in many aspects; one can propose that it is even carefully 
28 See Plato, Republic, Three Elements of Man, Perfection: Classical Utopias, BRITISH 
LIBRARY http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/21cc/utopia/perfection1/elements1/ 
elements.html [https://perma.cc/2D4J-JMNE] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
29 SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
Apr. 9, 2009, art. 18 (N. Kor.). 
30 Michael W. McKay, The Big Picture: The Rule of Law, 52 LA. B.J. 436 (2005). 
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drafted to ensure its limited scope within the country so that political 
leaders of the country can interpret the law how best suits their desires. 
There is ample room for open interpretation and discovery by the 
outside world.31 Because this system relies solely on one political party 
and the country’s leader (Suryong, meaning “Great Leader” or 
“Supreme Leader”), many further assume that its legal system is only 
a “façade” that prolongs the survival of the State.32 To many more, 
North Korea is simply a country “as abstract as the planet Neptune,”33 
leaving the entire question of the role of law hanging in the air. Such 
confusions only accumulate as its laws and regulations are often very 
difficult to study, and research can only be done to the extent that the 
country allows disclosure of its laws to the outside world.34 
From this perspective, there seems to be almost no possibility to 
predict changes of an entire regime by looking into the law, as decisions 
are made based on discretionary creativity by one or two individuals in 
the Kim family. An attempt in making ex ante estimates would almost 
certainly fail if analysts attempt to read one individual’s mind. Despite 
difficulties in relying on traditional legal and institutional 
developments to indicate North Korea’s policy direction, researching 
these developments is far from groundless because it can lead to 
important predictions. The constitution, in this respect, serves as a 
useful hint to the policy preferences of the very small group of people 
who make decisions in the country. As one scholar wrote, “Each 
of the constitutions of North Korea has emerged out of transformative 
moments when cumulative political change necessitated a 
corresponding legal expression to legitimate and articulate the new 
orientation and outlook of the state.”35 Thus, there is important 
scholarly value in taking a legal perspective in studying North Korea’s 
food safety regime because it provides an opportunity to understand the 
role of law in the universe of food safety. 
A careful look at the constitutional amendments over the past seven 
decades suggests that North Korea’s Constitution reforms run parallel 
31 As discussed later, even its food safety standards system remains confidential to the 
outside world. 
32 Darren C. Zook, Reforming North Korea: Law, Politics, and the Market Economy, 
48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 131, 134 (2012). 
33 Hon. Patrick Border, Reflections from the Other Korea, 15 HAW. B.J. 18, 18 (2011). 
34 Korean National Police University Research Business Foundation, 2012 nyun yihu je-
gaejungdwen bukhanbupryungyeongu [Study of North Korea’s Laws and Regulations 
Revised After Years] 19 (2017) (S. Kor.) (translation by Yi Seul Kim). 
35 Zook, supra note 32, at 135. 
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with, and almost represent, the different sociopolitical reforms that, in 
turn, initiate changes in the food safety regime. Such understanding 
makes it possible to conduct a comprehensive study beyond the 
parameters of solely looking at political and economic factors. Each of 
these periods shows changes, degrees of openness, and the influence of 
external factors. 
North Korea’s first constitution was adopted by the Supreme 
People’s Assembly at its first session on September 8, 1948, as the final 
product of a draft based on the Soviet Union’s 1936 Constitution.36 
Since then, the country has amended its constitution seven times: in 
1948, 1972, 1998, 2009, 2012, 2013, and 2016.37 It is important to note 
that the first two revisions were made under the supervision of Kim Il-
Sung, while the third and the fourth were made under Kim Jong Il’s 
supervision, and the fifth, sixth, and seventh were made under Kim 
Jong Un’s supervision. An examination of the constitutional 
amendments under the different political leaders is one way to 
categorize different phases of changes. The simultaneous law reforms 
and sociopolitical changes38 provide potential to predict certain 
changes by discerning different elements undergoing social progress: 
rule-of-man governance strictly around juche ideology, structural 
fragmentation, and social segmentation. 
B. Deification, Ideologies in a Rule-of-Man System, and the
Food Safety Regime 
Similar to constitutional amendments, the State’s ideology also 
serves as an indicator of food safety regime developments. This Section 
will analyze and discuss the implications of the juche and snuggun 
sasang ideologies and their dominating effect on the political landscape 
and thus, how food safety regimes are prioritized. The juche ideology 
is a philosophy and almost a religion to the people.39 It justifies and 
36 Korean National Police University Research Business Foundation, supra note 34, 
at 24–25. 
37 Zook, supra note 32, at 132; Mathew Ha, Amended North Korean Constitution 
Reaffirms Kim Jong Un’s Steadfast Faith in His Nuclear Arsenal, FOUND. FOR DEF. 
DEMOCRACIES (July 15, 2019), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/07/15/amended-north-
korean-constitution-reaffirms-kim-jong-uns-steadfast-faith-in-his-nuclear-arsenal/ 
[https://perma.cc/5SWA-BJF3]. 
38 See Zook, supra note 32, at 134–35. 
39 B.C., Just One More Religion?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 7, 2013), https://www.economist. 
com/erasmus/2013/04/07/just-one-more-religion [https://perma.cc/WS42-QMDV]. 
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controls almost all policies and state directions.40 While the term juche 
directly translates to “self-reliance” in Korean,41 it serves as the 
foundation of the rule-of-man system employed in North Korea. Under 
this ideology, Kim’s family has a distinguished lineage in which Kim 
Il-Sung (Kim Jong Un’s grandfather) is portrayed as a divine being and 
power.42 Article 3 of the State’s constitution stipulates that the juche 
ideology is the “guiding principle for all [Workers’ Party] actions.”43 
The preamble of the Workers’ Party Charter states that the party is 
guided only by Kim Il-Sung’s juche ideology and his revolutionary 
thoughts.44 There are concrete documents to put this ideology into 
practice. It is administered using a monolithic guide,45 the Ten 
Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System, which 
serves as a practical guideline for the people.46 It explains the divinity 
of Kim Il-Sung and mandates unconditional obedience, party-wide 
ideology, willpower, and revolutionary unity to center on Kim Il-
Sung.47 As a vital philosophy that “reign[s] supreme,” it also allows 
Kim Il-Sung’s influence to survive multiple generations.48 As very 
strong conceptual principles, they are very much infused in people’s 
lives through society and have a significant impact.49 
40 Amended SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
KOREA Dec. 1972, art. 3 (N. Kor.). 
41 Columbia Law Sch., Juche Ideology, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_ 
00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/3.html [https://perma.cc/NV4P-9JJX] (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Juche]. 
42 See id. 
43 Amended 1972 SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA Dec. 1972, art. 3 (N. Kor.). 
44 Juche, supra note 41. 
45 Korean National Police University Research Business Foundation, supra note 34. 
46 Columbia Law Sch., Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System, 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/10
%20principles%20of%20juche.html [https://perma.cc/QE5W-JMQ6] (last visited Feb. 17, 
2020) [hereinafter Ten Principles]. 
47 Fyodor Tertitskiy, The Party’s 10 Principles, Then and Now, NK NEWS (Dec. 11, 
2014), https://www.nknews.org/2014/12/the-partys-10-principles-then-and-now/ [https:// 
perma.cc/J4E8-5CNT]. 
48 Ten Principles, supra note 46; Christopher Green, Wrapped in a Fog: On the North 
Korean Constitution and the Ten Principles, SINO-NK (June 5, 2012), https://sinonk.com/ 
2012/06/05/chris-green-on-10-principles [https://perma.cc/5B98-GXGY]. 
49 Juche, supra note 41. “Entering the 1980s, North Korea put up the so-called ‘the 
fuehrer doctrine,’ explaining that ‘the Suryong (Leader) is an impeccable brain of the living 
body, the masses can be endowed with their life in exchange for their loyalty to him, and 
the Party is the nerve of that living body.’ This formed the frame of today’s Juche Ideology 
and enabled North Korea to begin an unreserved propaganda campaigns [sic] to justify the 
father-to-son power succession plan.” Id. 
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Law, in this sense, is used as a tool to further the supreme 
principles.50 In terms of the hierarchy of the legal system, the Ten 
Principles rest at the top, followed by the Korean Workers’ Party rules, 
followed by the constitution, and then rules and regulations 
promulgated by agencies and state officials.51 
Juche first made an appearance in the 1972 Constitution.52 
Interestingly, it did not make its debut immediately during Kim Il-
Sung’s political era. In fact, it took a generation for it to become a part 
of the constitution, in 1972.53 This delay is perhaps attributable to the 
fact that, prior to 1972, North Korea was more interested in devoting 
its limited resources and time to wiping out its Japanese colonization 
history.54 Around this time, the country had to focus on constructing 
and establishing an independent country and a sovereign government. 
Its laws were also based heavily on the Soviet Union’s Constitution as 
a new communist state.55 
It was not until the 1980s that Kim Jong Il (Kim Il-Sung’s son and 
Kim Jong Un’s father) sought to develop the State’s own ideology as 
“the only pure socialist state remaining,” after observing that the Soviet 
Union and China had begun to undertake economic and political 
reforms.56 Within two decades, juche had become a binding ideology 
in every part of the society from culture to the economy.57 Any 
activities that were not seen to conform to the ideology were strictly 
prohibited, and offenders were criminally liable. By 1998, when Kim 
Jong Il had become Chairman of the National Defense Commission, 
Kim Il-Sung was officially known as the “Eternal President.”58 He and 
his words were still of divine authority even though, in practice, Kim 
Jong Il was the de facto ruler and the Supreme Leader as stipulated in 
50 See DPRK Updates “Ten Principles,” N. KOR. ECON. WATCH (Aug. 9, 2013, 
1:55 PM), http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/08/09/dprk-updates-ten-principles/ [https:// 
perma.cc/XKN8-FE2D]. 
51 Korean National Police University Research Business Foundation, supra note 34, at 
19. 
52 Zook, supra note 32, at 138–39. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 1948 CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA art. 4 
(N. Kor.). 
56 Zook, supra note 32, at 139. 
57 See generally KIM JONG-IL, ON THE JUCHE IDEA (1982). 
58 Zook, supra note 32, at 143; see also Cho Jae-Hyun, Bughanheonbeob-ui byeonhwa-e 
gwanhan yeongu [Study on North Korea’s Constitutional Law Amendments], available at 
https://academic.naver.com/article.naver?doc_id=79765256 [https://perma.cc/Z8AD-R64P]. 
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the 2009 Constitution.59 Kim Jong Il was the “guardian and cultivator” 
of the juche state.60 In fact, three out of the seven constitutions of North 
Korea are named after either Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong Il, juche ideology, 
or the “revolutionary ideology” created by the “great leader” Kim Il-
Sung.61 
In 2009, another ideology, known as sunggun sasang, made an 
appearance in the constitution.62 Directly translated as “military-first 
ideology,” it did not aim to substitute the juche ideology, but rather 
supplement it.63 It was introduced as an additional philosophy and 
ideology for the State and its people. According to this ideology, the 
North Korean army plays both a political and a military role, for which 
it receives priority in state resources.64 From the perspective of food 
law scholarship, the prioritization of military production and supply 
serves as direct evidence of societal fragmentation. 
As such, deification and ideological isolation imply certain patterns 
in the food safety regime. For example, the 2009 Constitution departed 
from its predecessors by completely erasing any mention of 
communism and Marxist-Leninist ideology, or any foreign ideologies 
for that matter. The juche state was the most superior system for the 
State to build and maintain power.65 The country had distinguished 
itself from any other communist states, meaning that now there was 
room, supported by law, for the State to introduce policies and 
regulations to further its unique ideological path. This was proven by 
the “society-family hybrid” State of North Korea in the 2009 
Constitution.66 It referred to North Korea as a society-family hybrid and 
59 Zook, supra note 32, at 143; see also Jae-Hyun, supra note 58. 
60 Zook, supra note 32, at 143; see also Jae-Hyun, supra note 58. 
61 See JONG-IL, supra note 57, at 16, 18. 
62 Amended 1972 SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA Apr. 9, 2009, arts. 3, 59, 109 (N. Kor.). 
63 See Kim Nam Sik, What Is ‘Seongun Politics’?, TONGIL NEWS (Dec. 30, 2004, 10:56 
AM), http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=50938 [https://perma.cc/ 
UDK2-3TYP]. 
64 Zook, supra note 32, at 146. 
65 Amended 1972 SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA Apr. 9, 2009, pmbl. (N. Kor.); Jung Eung Ki, Bughan Sahoejuuiheonbeob-ui 
gibon-wonli-juchesasang [Fundamental Principles of the Socialist Constitution of North 
Korea – Juche Idea], 51 INST. L. STUD. PUSAN NAT’L UNIV. L. REV. 219 (2010); Zook, 
supra note 32, at 146. 
66 Amended 1972 SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA Apr. 9, 2009, pmbl. (N. Kor.) (“Comrade Kim Il Sung . . . always mixed with the 
people, devoted his whole life to them and turned the whole of society into a large family 
. . . .”). 
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emphasized the strong bond between society and family.67 People were 
now grouped together as both parts of the society and a large family.68 
Such references to a “society-family hybrid” or familism created a 
stronger foundation for a patriarchal society that Kim Il-Sung used to 
justify passing his supreme political powers down the family tree as 
well.69 Internally, North Koreans were required to support state policies 
that were defying other foreign ideologies and international 
relationships. This strengthening of the juche ideology has affected 
domestic production and consumption of food products.70 With 
tightened control on the influx of foreign goods and strictly limited 
relationships with foreign entities, North Korean consumers have 
become increasingly selective, choosing either voluntarily or 
involuntarily to consume local food products.71 
C. Structural Fragmentation
Structural fragmentation in governance ironically originates from 
the strong rule-of-man system. This Article presupposes that the rule-
of-man system, based on the juche ideology, is a formalistic one that 
lacks both structural and practical tools to de facto ensure fair and 
efficient governance in the food safety regime. 
While the food processing industry (shikryo gagong gongup) 
emphasizes improving living standards, North Korea’s complex 
governance structure for food safety often inhibits regulatory 
progress.72 At the outset, the State operates on government organs and 
the Korean Workers’ Party for state affairs, in which Kim Jong Un 
heads both branches.73 Yet the governance structure is extremely 
fragmented, with modest centralization improvements made in the last 
decade. Since 1948, much of the State’s work focused on ensuring and 
67 Zook, supra note 32, at 146. 
68 Id. at 147. 
69 Id.; see also Jae-Hyun, supra note 58. 
70 Sue-Lin Wong & James Pearson, Here’s What It’s Like Inside a North Korean 
Grocery Store, BUS. INSIDER (May 11, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
north-korea-trump-store-food-2017-5?IR=T%2F [https://perma.cc/S97N-948L]. 
71 Id.; see also JONG-IL, supra note 57, at 14–16. 
72 See Kim Young Hui, Bukhan shikryo gongup siltaewa junmang [Current Status and 
Prospect of the North Korean Food Industry] (Jan. 1, 2009), http://icals.snu.ac.kr/html/rnd_ 
policy/rnd_trand.asp?flag=READ&idx=627&s_bun1=%uAE30%uD0C0 [https://perma. 
cc/HN2V-GCFH] (translation by Yi Seul Kim). 
73 See 2019 Supreme People’s Assembly Organization Chart, MINISTRY UNIFICATION 
(Apr. 11, 2019), http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/getPowerStructureDang.do 
[https://perma.cc/8424-7ZT6]. 
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strengthening control over many aspects of people’s lives. Different 
tools were used, such as state institutions, ministries, and organs.74 
In the first constitution that entered into effect in 1948, the intent of 
strengthening control was not so obvious as the Korean Workers’ Party 
(KWP) was still very devoted to constructing the State.75 The 
constitution still had conflicting interests to accommodate in its text, as 
it was not unchallenged, and it ended up accommodating ideas that 
would be much less likely to appear today, such as recognizing private 
ownership of properties and private enterprises.76 Almost three decades 
later, however, Kim Il-Sung was able to gain full control of the KWP, 
and the constitution reflected well this expansion of power. Under Kim 
Il-Sung’s new control, private ownership of properties and enterprises 
were not allowed by law.77 Bolstering the power of the Kim family 
became explicit in 1992 when the National Defense Commission 
(NDC) (gukbangwiweonhoe) became an independent agency and the 
highest military organ in the country.78 In 1998, structural reforms took 
place, but these were considered more of a simple clarification to 
emphasize Kim Jong Il’s authority and effect a bolstering of his 
political power. Under the revisions, Kim Jong Il was to serve as 
Chairman of the NDC, General-Secretary of the KWP, and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People’s Army simultaneously.79 
In addition, the KWP was able to exercise and maintain supreme 
authority over all areas of society.80 The NDC saw an expansion of 
power in the 2009 Constitution to control and manage state affairs and 
“issue edicts . . . of any sort on any topic.”81 The recent revisions placed 
very limited restrictions on the leaders of the country. However, a 
stronger rule-of-man system centered on one particular individual has 
resulted in structural fragmentation in the country’s food safety regime. 
To better understand this structural fragmentation, a review of the food 
governance structure is important. 
74 Zook, supra note 32, at 135. 
75 Id. at 135–36. 
76 Eung Ki, supra note 65, at 219; Zook, supra note 32, at 135–36. 
77 Zook, supra note 32, at 136. 
78 Id. at 139–40. 
79 Id. at 143. 
80 Eung Ki, supra note 65; see also Zook, supra note 32, at 145; Jae-Hyun, supra note 
58, at 143. 
81 Zook, supra note 32, at 145. 
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1. Party Organs
In general, the congressional party that selects the Chairman of the
Workers’ Party of Korea (currently Kim Jong Un) oversees seven 
different organs that serve various functions: 
(1) Organizes the Party Central Military Commission;
(2) Elects the members of the Political Bureau;
(3) Organizes the Executive Policy Bureau as it elects the Vice-
Chairman in the Bureau;
(4) Elects members for the Control Commission;
(5) Elects the members of the Party Central Auditing Commission;
(6) Appoints nineteen department and office heads; and
(7) Supervises Municipal and Provincial Party Representatives.82
The Municipal and Provincial Party Representatives elect the heads 
of the following committees: Pyongyang Municipality, Nason 
Municipality, Nampo Municipality, Kangwon Province, Yanggang 
Province, Chagang Province, North Pyongan Province, South Pyongan 
Province, North Hwanghae Province, South Hwanghae Province, 
North Hamgyong Province, and South Hamgyong Province.83 
2. Government Organs
In terms of the government organs, the State Affairs Commission is
headed by Chairman Kim Jong Un after being elected in 2016 by the 
Supreme People’s Assembly. The State Affairs Commission supervises 
three ministries; namely, the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces,84 the 
Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of People’s Security.85 It 
also supervises the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance 
Commission.86 To understand the food safety regime, it is important to 
note the system’s administrative organization and recognize that the 
82 The nineteen departments and offices comprise the following: Organization and 
Guidance Department, Propaganda and Agitation Department, Cadres Department, Light 
Industry Department, Economic Affairs Department, Science and Education Department, 
International Department, Military Department, Machine-Building Industry Department, 
Working Organization Department, Agriculture Department, Party History Institute, 
Document Archive Department, Civil Defense Department, Appeals Office, Finance 
Accounting Department, General Affairs Department, United Front Department and 
Office No. 29. See Party Organs, MINISTRY UNIFICATION, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/ 
eng_unikorea/relations/infoNK/leadership/party/ [https://perma.cc/5KE9-9EU2]  
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State Affairs Commission supervises forty-five organizations that 
indirectly affect the food regime in the Cabinet.87 
In essence, there are seven ministries that oversee safe food 
production and consumption. Among these seven, food processing 
factories and agencies (giyupso) are supervised by the Ministry of 
Light Industry, led by Il Yong Choi, as part of the Cabinet directly 
supervised by the State Affairs Commission.88 While public record of 
his background with the Light Industry dates back to 2008, Choi’s 
relevant experience in food safety is unknown.89 Often, the Supreme 
Leader handpicks the related personnel that monitor and supervise the 
governance of food processing factories and agencies. 
3. Current Food Safety Regime Structure
Meanwhile, North Korea’s limited efforts to centralize the
monitoring of food production do exist on record. Prior to July 2009, 
central state agencies located in Pyongyang were directly supervised 
by the Ministry of Light Industry, and those located in the suburbs were 
supervised by the relevant municipal city or county instead of the 
Ministry.90 This was revised in 2009 with the Supreme People’s 
Assembly’s Notice 161 to create the new Ministry of Food and 
Consumer Goods Industries.91 With the creation of this ministry, the 
central state food factories located in Pyongyang came under the direct 
supervision of the Ministry of Food and Consumer Goods Industries. 
Likewise, suburban food-processing factories came under supervision 
of the same ministry, albeit indirectly.92 This was because factories in 
the suburban areas still remained under the supervision of the People’s 
Committees in the relevant municipal city or county.93 This suggests, 
however, that there is still much fragmentation in the structure. For 
example, when it comes to food produced and processed by cooperative 
groups, the Cabinet’s relevant administrative agencies, such as the 
87 See id. 
88 Id. 
89 North Korea Information Portal, REPUBLIC KOR., MINISTRY UNIFICATION, 
http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/viewPeople.do [https://perma.cc/HLA3-SA4B] 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
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Agricultural Department and the Fisheries Department, retain control 
and supervision over them.94 
To make matters worse, the food-processing industry in North Korea 
is generally classified into three different large groups for policy 
matters.95 The first group in the food-processing industry processes raw 
ingredients from agriculture, meat, and seafood. Its aim is to produce 
raw ingredients for groups other than consumers. The second group in 
the industry focuses on using the raw ingredients from the first group 
to produce a novel food product. The last group uses foods produced 
by the first and the second group to produce other novel food products. 
Generally, North Korea limits much of its resources to the first and the 
second group as a State policy.96 The classification of the three different 
groups assists our understanding of the resource allocation and 
prioritization. But it also serves as direct evidence of the food industry 
being structurally fragmented from its deep roots, with state resources 
allocated by the State depending on political priorities. Therefore, 
ideologies cannot be seen independent from this issue. 
In addition, despite the planned governance structure, agency 
jurisdiction often gets ignored as Kim’s orders will prevail, which 
becomes a serious challenge to proper supervision of the food safety 
governance regime. In particular, at the inspection stage of the food 
processing industry, there have been problems with determining 
the proper agency supervision arrangement.97 For example, Kim Jong 
Un visited Kumsanpo Salted Seafood Factory in January 2018 to 
emphasize the importance of sanitary food-production practices. There, 
he was joined by factory workers and nine individuals holding 
government positions with various committees that did not pertain to 
food safety.98 At this supervision trip, Kim Jong Un established several 
mandates: sanitary food production practices; hygienic environments 
both in and out of the factory; the elimination of possible origins of 
contamination; and a focus on proper storage and management of 
ingredients, food additives, and containers.99 Kim also emphasized the 
importance of state-of-the-art product inspection equipment, processes, 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1. 
96 Id. 
97 Lee Seung Hyun, North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un, Geumsan Fish Processing Plant, 
TONGILNEWS.COM (Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html? 
idxno=125780 [https://perma.cc/S8CZ-8TMH] (title of webpage translated by Yi Seul 
Kim); North Korea Information Portal, supra note 89. 
98 Hyun, supra note 97; North Korea Information Portal, supra note 89. 
99 Hyun, supra note 97. 
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and product-inspection procedures. Finally, Kim set a mandate to 
adhere to principles that allow for fast, precise, scientific, and objective 
inspection.100 However, many of his official visits to food production 
and processing facilities are similar to the aforementioned example 
where he is often accompanied by powerful bureaucrats who hold little 
specialized knowledge and experience about sanitary food-production 
practices.101 
D. Social Segmentation
Access to safe food differs strikingly based on the family group an 
individual belongs to, education level, wealth, geographic location, 
and nationality, as discussed below. The food safety regime is a 
complex system in which society is segmented both horizontally and 
vertically.102 Since the 1948 Constitution, there was much devotion 
paid to centralizing power to the Kim family and maturing as a 
country.103 This societal segmentation became evident in the 1972 
Constitution as Kim Il-Sung’s power became unchallengeable. Over 
the decades, as Kim’s family continued to build its lineage and power, 
the country has witnessed severe social segmentation based on family 
political status, education, and wealth, among other factors. 
Interestingly, this segmentation has become even more drastic since 
Kim Jong Un took power in 2011. North Korea can be considered one 
of the most socially segmented nations in the world. 
1. Vertical Segmentation
For the purpose of analyzing North Korea, understanding vertical
segmentation is rather self-explanatory because of its inherent 
hierarchical foundation. At the top of the hierarchy rests Kim and his 
100 Id. 
101 In such a political system, agency coordination and jurisdiction may be of secondary 
matters in terms of importance. Likewise, it is well known that Pyongyang’s seafood buffet 
restaurant, named Taedonggang Seafood Restaurant, which was visited by South Korea’s 
President Moon and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, was planned by the Korean Worker’s 
Party’s Political Bureau. North Korea’s army got involved in catching the body of fish 
needed to run the restaurant. Now On My Way to Meet You (Channel A television broadcast 
Sept. 30, 2018) (showing that agency coordination and jurisdiction are of secondary 
matters). 
102 Such fragmentation has previously been mentioned by scholars such as Zhou Guanqi, 
John K. Yasuda, and Francis Snyder. 
103 Zook, supra note 32, at 137. 
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immediate family.104 For this special group, there are exclusive food 
processing factories, agencies, and farms.105 
At the core of these exclusive establishments for the Kim family is 
the Howi Science Research Center, which is composed of Basic 
Science Research Center, Mancheongsan Research Center, and 
Cheongamsan Research Center.106 Out of these three research centers, 
the Basic Science Research Center was the first to be established in 
1982 when Kim Il-Sung was seventy years old.107 The Center’s motto 
is “the Leader’s Longevity and Health is Most Important After He 
Reaches Age 40.”108 This Center is known to study food safety 
exclusively for Kim’s family.109 These three research centers continue 
to exist today for the exclusive purpose of promoting Kim Jong Un’s 
health, particularly after February 2009 when he rose to power.110 
The Basic Science Research Center employs approximately two 
thousand researchers, research assistants, and clinicians. Researchers 
are known to have majored in physiology, microbiology, food 
engineering, genetic engineering, and linguistics.111 The Basic Science 
Research Center runs eight research laboratories. Lab 1 focuses on 
developing nutritious and fine-tasting beverages.112 This lab includes 
an alcohol research team that works on developing alcoholic beverages 
aimed at extending life, a crop research team, and a spice research 
team.113 Lab 2 focuses on researching rare herbs and organic plants.114 
Lab 3 is in charge of developing both delicious and nutritious meat with 
a low level of cholesterol.115 Various teams, such as the beef research 
team, the pork research team, and the poultry research team, exist to 
104 His family is often referred to as the “fifth family” (5-go-daek). 
105 Kim Ju Won, Kimssi ilga ‘Mansumuganggyeonguso’ggaji daemullim [Kim’s Family 
Passed down to the Mansu Mugang Research Institute], RADIO FREE ASIA (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/ae40c528c77cac00c758-c228aca8c9c4-c9c4c2e4/ 
co-su-02242015095830.html [https://perma.cc/W7U7-FQ98] (translation by Yi Seul Kim). 
106 Kim Ju Won, Kimilsung ilga gungangeul wyihan yeongugiguandeul [Kim Il-Sung 
Research Institute for Family Health], RADIO FREE ASIA (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.rfa. 
org/korean/weekly_program/ae40c528c77cac00c758-c228aca8c9c4-c9c4c2e4/co-su-
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conduct qualitative research.116 These research teams use an exclusive 
farm located in Hwanghae Province.117 Lab 4 conducts studies on 
organic vegetables and fruits that Kim Jong Un enjoys.118 The focus of 
this group is to find and develop produce with maximized taste, scent, 
and nutrition.119 The greenhouse for Lab 4 is also located in Hwanghae 
Province. Lab 5 exclusively works on fish products and includes a 
freshwater fish research team, a marine fish research team, and a 
marine plants research team.120 The lab works on removing any 
unpleasant odor from fish and develops methods to extract nutrition 
from fish.121 Lab 6 is wholly composed of experts working on 
developing cigarettes that can prevent lung cancer and high blood 
pressure.122 There are two teams in Lab 6: a domestic cigarette research 
team and an overseas cigarette research team.123 Lab 7 researches 
illnesses and is composed of an obesity research team, an 
arteriosclerosis research team, and a high blood pressure team.124 Lab 
8 uses different kinds of analysis indicators to study raw ingredients 
and components of specialized, local food products.125 
Aside from the Basic Science Research Center that operates 
eight different labs, there are two other research centers, as mentioned 
above. These two centers employ approximately 130 and 280 experts, 
respectively.126 While not much information is available, 
Cheongamsan Research Center is also known as the 965th Army to 
study food, illness, and conducting research related to health.127 
Mancheongsan Research Center falls under the supervision of the 73rd 
Division (73 Chongguk) and is located in Pyongyang.128 This center 











126 JoonAng Ilbo, Bukhan Kimjungil ilga Mansumugangyeonguso Jonjehanda [North 
Korean Kim Jong II Family Mansu Mugang Research Institute], JOONGANG DAILY 
(Feb. 22, 2011), https://news.joins.com/article/5091831 [https://perma.cc/KK5T-CGR3], 
(translated by Yi Seul Kim). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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which Kim’s family participates.129 All staff members at the research 
centers are graduates of Kim Il-Sung University College of Life 
Sciences, Medical Science University (Pyongyang Medical 
University), Pyongyang Light Industry University, and Pyongyang 
Foreign Language University.130 Research center employees must 
adhere to strict safety measures and are subject to extensive political 
background checks to ensure the Kim family’s safety and health.131 
In addition to these research centers, North Korea operates a farm 
for an extremely selective range of produce for the Kim family.132 
Produce cultivated in these greenhouses undergoes strict cleaning and 
microscopic testing at a factory specifically established for this 
purpose.133 Only elite university graduates in their twenties are hired.134 
Since the 1970s, besides prioritizing Kim’s family, North Korea has 
divided its general population into four different social classes 
underneath Kim’s family.135 Immediately underneath Kim’s direct 
family is the “core crowd group,” followed by the “common crowd 
group,” then the “complicated crowd group,” and lastly the “hostile 
class,” also known as the “remainders.”136 The “core crowd” consists 
of Korean War veteran families, formal visitors to Kim Jong Un, 
honored soldiers, and persons of merit who have made significant 
contributions to the State.137 This special crowd lives in Pyongyang 
and has access to some of the State’s finer-quality food products. 
The “common crowd” includes labor workers, farmers, soldiers, 
and intellects throughout the country.138 The “complicated crowd 
group” is, as the name suggests, families of those punished, military 
draft evaders, and South Korean defectors.139 The “hostile class,” 
the “remainders,” includes families of North Korean defectors who 
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religious persons, party antagonists, landowners, and 
businesspersons.140 The last group of people live far from Pyongyang 
and are subject to food produced from local ingredients of substandard 
quality, as discussed later. 
One separate branch of consumers that exists in North Korea 
comprises the foreigners and tourists. There are set meals for 
foreigners,141 and foreigners are usually taken to a specific set of 
restaurants around the country. The experiences foreigners have at 
these restaurants do not reflect what most of the public in other parts of 
North Korea consume on a daily basis. 
A unique feature of social segmentation in North Korea that 
undoubtedly exists in the food safety regime is the collective 
punishment that affects three generations.142 North Korea is one of the 
very few countries in the world, if not the only, that places liability on 
three generations for an act done by an individual.143 Accordingly, if 
the liable individual and his or her family live in Pyongyang, they will 
be relocated to a rural community. If the liable individual’s family 
already lives in a rural community, they will be relocated to a much 
more rural community, and so forth.144 A combination of their location 
and criminal record will, in turn, affect their future generations’ 
education, economic status, employment, et cetera.145 
2. Horizontal Segmentation
The horizontal societal segmentation is much less clear to an
outsider. Food production is different from other industries and is 
mostly managed by the local government.146 Food production factories 
in Pyongyang mainly focus on serving Pyongyang citizens. As first-
class citizens of the country, better food is provided to ensure continued 
obedience and loyalty to the party. There are large-scale facilities that 
produce crops, flour, kimchi, rice, bread, soy and bean sauce, and beer 
140 Yoo Gwangjin, Bughan-ui Sahoechejewa Gyecheung-gujo-e Gwanhan Gochal 
[Study on North Korea: A Study on the Social System and Strata Structure of North Korea], 
10 N. KOR. STUD. J. 51 (1980); see also Interview with Defectors, supra note 135. 
141 Fuchsia Dunlop, Eating in North Korea: ‘We Were Being Fed a Story,’ FIN. TIMES, 
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1f9bbfc0-9d93-11e7-9a86-4d5a475ba4c5 
[https://perma.cc/P2XP-73RW]. 
142 See Gwangjin, supra note 140; see also Interview with Defectors, supra note 135. 
143 See Gwangjin, supra note 140; see also Interview with Defectors, supra note 135. 
144 See also Interview with Defectors, supra note 135; Zook, supra note 32, at 149–50. 
145 Zook, supra note 32, at 148–50. 
146 Hui, supra note 72, at 96. 
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with the aim of producing high-quality food for the local residents.147 
These factories use best-quality ingredients from the countryside 
together with imported ingredients for production. Factories in the 
countryside are allocated production quotas for these Pyongyang 
factories.148 
A review of the Pyongyang City Management Law that was 
promulgated in 1998 and amended twice—in 2010 and 2014—proves 
the extra care the State has taken when it comes to managing food 
safety.149 Although the amendments were not designed to exclusively 
target improving food safety, they included many aspects dealing with 
food safety issues. To understand social segmentation between 
Pyongyang and the rest of the State, it is important to discuss the textual 
changes in this law. In 2010, the phrase “capital city establishment 
policy” first made an appearance in the Pyongyang City Management 
Law. With this policy, the State seems to have made it very clear that 
there would be extra measures to ensure that Pyongyang has its own 
development plan. In fact, the policy was not merely about city 
planning; rather, it was a concrete plan devised to provide a special 
citizenry status to people living in Pyongyang, which is viewed as a 
privilege by the entire country’s population. The city management plan 
was to be designed carefully and precisely to allow step-by-step 
systematic management of the city.150 Kim Jong Un’s plan to develop 
Pyongyang into a location more than a mere capital city is well 
articulated in Article 49, which states that “all organizations, agencies 
and associations shall be actively mobilized and be interested in 
building Pyongyang into the center of the ‘seonggun culture.’ ”151 With 
the absence of a policy that applies uniformly across the entire nation, 
the State has a clear lack of appropriate implementation of its uniform 
food safety policies. 
In other cities and provinces, local mid- and small-sized factories 
producing products such as corn, sauce, oil, alcohol, and sweets serve 
their local populations. There exists a clear distinction between 
Pyongyang and rural areas in this regard. In rural areas, most food 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 DPRK PYONGYANG CITY MANAGEMENT LAW, KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE 
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH BUSINESS FOUNDATION, 2012 NYUN YIHU JE-GAEJUNGDWEN 
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ingredients are produced locally; therefore, the quality of the 
production is inconsistent and differs between provinces. The central 
government designates one crop factory for each province, and each 
district is also allocated one factory for sauce, oil, alcohol, and 
sweets.152 The people often resort to marketplaces to gain access to 
safer food produced with better-quality ingredients. In Haeju, there are 
three major marketplaces with approximately five thousand sellers.153 
In Hweryung, there are two major marketplaces with approximately 
2,500 sellers as of 2013.154 The State has also been moving to specialize 
in certain production. Fruit-processing factories are mainly based 
where the fruit is grown, such as Hwanghaedo Guail-gun, Hwangju-
gun, Eunyul-gun, Bongsan-gun, Sookcheon in Pyeongnam, and 
Bukcheon in Hamnam.155 Fish-processing factories are focused around 
Shinpo, Kimchaek, and Wonsan production bases.156 Meat and soda 
drink factories are focused in large cities such as Pyongyang, 
Cheongjin, Hamheung, and Shineuiju, where the consumer base 
exists.157 Each of these bases would be worthwhile subjects for further 
study. 
E. State-Led Efforts (Public Awareness)
Food Hygiene Law, as a principal body of law governing food 
hygiene practice in the country, was most recently revised in April 
2013 with the purpose of protecting and promoting people’s health.158 
Following the revision, Article 4 now newly stipulates that any 
organization that produces, sells, or supplies foodstuffs shall first be 
issued a hygiene license from the relevant sanitary supervision 
authority.159 This applies throughout the country beyond Pyongyang. 
152 Hui, supra note 72, at 2. 
153 KWAK IN-OK, REPUBLIC OF KOREA MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION, 
BUKHANSHIJANG SILTAEBUNSUK MIT BYUNGHWA BANGHYANGSUNG 
[NORTH KOREA MARKET ANALYSIS AND CHANGE DIRECTION STUDY], 2–3 
(2013), http://www.prism.go.kr/homepage/origin/retrieveOriginDetail.do?cond_research_name 
=&cond_research_start_date=&cond_research_end_date=&cond_organ_id=1250000&research
_id=1250000-201400026&leftMenuLevel=120 [https://perma.cc/7WRA-FYNQ] (translation 
by Yi Seul Kim). 
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155 Hui, supra note 72, at 2. 
156 Id. at 3. 
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158 Joseonminjujuuiinmingonghwagug siglyopum-wisaengbeob [Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea Food Hygiene Act], effective Apr. 4, 2013. 
159 Id. at art. 3. 
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Without a hygiene license, any organization is prohibited from either 
producing food products or operating a related business.160 
In order to further ensure food safety, North Korea developed an 
official industry standardization system known as “KPS,” administered 
by the National Quality Supervision Bureau. The National Quality 
Supervision Bureau sets the mandatory standards in the State.161 The 
National Quality Supervision Bureau was established in August 
1949.162 It is directly under the supervision of the National Standard- 
Setting Research Center, Central Measurement Science Research 
Center, and the Quality Certification Center as stipulated in the Quality 
Supervision Law, Standardization Law, and Measurement Law.163 
Article 5 of the Standardization Law stipulates that unifying 
standards are a basic requirement for the communist system.164 The 
Standardization Law was amended in 2015 to include detailed 
procedures and requirements for drafts of standards. Under Article 14 
(Drafting of Standards for Production of Novel Goods and Introduction 
of Novel Technique), agencies are required to submit a proposed draft 
of national standards to the State’s central standard supervision 
authority.165 Under Article 23, if any produced good fails to meet 
national standards or no applicable national standards exist, the 
producer cannot be granted a production plan authorization, price, or 
labeling authorization.166 The National Standard-Setting Research 
Center is in charge of international coordination, creating provisions to 
standardize information services, and amending and setting industry 
standards.167 Standardization Law, Article 31, prohibits external 
disclosure of any national standards without the required supervising 
department’s authorization.168 For this reason, the number of existing 
standards and the details are yet to be confirmed. Some speculate that 
160 Id. at art. 4. 
161 Bukhaneui Gukga Gyugyuk (KPS) Gwa ‘Gukga Pumjil Gamdokguk’ [North Korea’s 
National Standard (KPS) and ‘National Quality Supervision Bureau’], NK TECH, 
http://www.nktech.net/inform/nkt_briefing/nkt_briefing_v.jsp?s_code_cd=focus&record_no
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there are approximately 120 health- and hygiene-related standards and 
134 standards regarding agriculture, forestry, and livestock.169 
Although it may be a foreign idea to many, the State has additionally 
established food standards for specific food menus, such as Pyongyang 
Cold Noodles and Rice Cakes, as part of its state-led efforts to improve 
food safety. In addition, in furtherance of improving its standards, the 
State engaged in active collaboration with a number of countries such 
as China (2002), Laos (2003), Vietnam (2004), South Korea (2004), 
and Russia (2005).170 It also uses private standards such as Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) for a selected variety of 
food products.171 In the end, compliance with these international 
standards may also indicate strong orientation with other states that 
claim to endorse a system with the rule of law and the important 
principles that go with it. 
Interestingly, in addition to these efforts, the State has also become 
active in collecting information from abroad for reference and research 
at home. In 2018, among the resources collected via agencies and 
consulates stationed abroad were research products for microalgae 
reproduction, safe seeds to consume that needed fewer fertilizers, 
Russian potato varieties that harvest more than 60 tons per 9,917.4 
square meters, samples of potato powder, food produced from 
processed potato powder, and samples of vinegar drinks.172 
F. Strengthening Grassroot Participation
Often, it is the training and education of food safety that determines 
what is indeed implemented and practiced. In fact, training and 
education are at the core of realizing food safety. One notorious 
example is the popularity of the petrol-cooked clams in the country: 
“On the east coast, North Koreans cook clams on a sheet of metal. On 
the west coast, they pour petrol over them and set them on fire. Then 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Bae, Gimchi Maegju Hwajangpum Deung ISO·HACCP Gugjepumjil Injeung 
Hwalbal [Active ISO / HACCP International Quality Certification in North Korea, 
Kimchi, Beer, and Cosmetics], YNA (May 28, 2019), https://www.yna.co.kr/view/ 
AKR20190527139000504 [https://perma.cc/9FHN-EP98]. 
172 Kim Ji Young, Buk Nodongdang, Sasilsang ‘Haewye Sanup Seupayi Hwaldong’ Jisi 
[North Korean Labor Party In Effect Orders For “Overseas Industrial Espionage”], 
SISAPRESS.COM (May 18, 2018), http://www.sisapress.com/journal/articlePrint/175433 
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they put more petrol on and keep going until they think it’s done.”173 
With a slight concern for the safety of the food, the people then pour 
and drink soju straight from the empty clam shell as a sterilization 
mechanism.174 The lack of necessary information and education 
regarding food safety has created a situation where foreigners have 
created a list of foods to avoid.175 
Nevertheless, information flow is increasing inside the country due 
to technological development, which in turn has encouraged and 
strengthened grassroots participation and empowerment in the food 
safety regime. According to the amended 2013 Product Differentiation 
Code Law, Article 2 mandates product differentiation codes to be used 
in production and distribution.176 Article 26 newly stipulated that all 
products must display production year and storage conditions.177 At the 
same time, although the network does reach overseas, a study shows 
that there are approximately five million cellphones that are currently 
being used in the general population. These smartphones allow 
Pyongyang users to download food delivery applications called 
“Okryu” that have chicken, beer, and cold noodles delivered to 
the comfort of their homes.178 “[C]onsumer goods are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated and QR or matrix barcodes can be found on 
a wide range of products, like makeup and soft drinks.”179 
Grassroots participation is closely intertwined with growing 
awareness of food safety–related problems. A strong hint to the food 
production and food safety level in a country is the gross national 
production level.180 However, North Korea has not disclosed any 
173 Jamie Fullerton, A Guide to North Korean Food from a Man Who’s Been Eating It 
for 14 Years, VICE (Feb. 17, 2018), https://munchies.vice.com/en_us/article/53qbd8/a-guide-
to-north-korean-food-from-a-man-whos-been-eating-it-for-14-years [https://perma.cc/ 
QM3K-8J5M]. 
174 Now On My Way to Meet You (Channel A television broadcast Nov. 25, 2018). 
175 Fullerton, supra note 173. 
176 Korean National Police University Research Business Foundation, supra note 34, at 
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figures regarding its economy.181 Accordingly, researchers must review 
changes in spending in different sectors to make an educated guess of 
North Korea’s productivity. From 2017 to 2018, North Korea officially 
stated that the country increased national expenditure on education by 
5.9%, improving economic independence or self-reliance (juche) by 
4.9%, and public health by 6.0%.182 
Although the country has continued to strengthen its own ideology, 
at the same time it has slowly progressed on opening up its borders and 
seeking economic growth. This was particularly noticeable in the 1992 
Constitution, which tried to indicate such a trend. For the first time, the 
constitution mentioned the potential for economic prosperity.183 Yet, it 
still took eight years until the 1984 Joint Venture Act entered into 
effect. The Act established the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone, and the 
1992 Constitution reaffirmed the legitimacy of this trade zone.184 
In 1992, the constitution took a small turn from distancing and 
antagonizing itself from South Korea.185 It emphasized “independence, 
peace, and friendship” (jaju pyeonghwa chinseon) as part of its foreign 
policy.186 It even recognized the democratic rights (minjujuuijeok 
minjokgweonri) of Koreans living outside its borders.187 This became 
the stepping stone to building the Kaesong Industrial Complex a decade 
later.188 
This development was still made with caution and perhaps a 
struggle between interests: the 1992 Constitution emphasized that the 
State had exclusive ownership of production means and stipulated 
collectivism as the policy foundation.189 Today, while this has not 
changed, the general public suffers much from solely relying on the 
181 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, North Korea’s Economic Contraction in 2018: 
What the BoK Numbers Tell Us, N. KOR. ECON. WATCH (July 26, 2019, 2:30 AM), 
https://www.nkeconwatch.com/2019/07/26/north-koreas-economic-contraction-in-2018-
what-the-bok-numbers-tell-us/ [https://perma.cc/YT29-AZS9]. 
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Number, Any Number, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2018), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/ 
2018-north-korea-economy-size [https://perma.cc/4DEY-3NJB]. 
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27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1289, 1299–1300 (2004). 
184 Zook, supra note 32, at 141. 
185 Yoon, supra note 183, at 1299. 
186 Zook, supra note 32, at 140–41. 
187 Id. at 141. 
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State’s production means. North Korea sparsely grows wheat and most 
of its milling raw materials are imported.190 Article 14 of the Food 
Hygiene Law was revised in 2013 to stipulate that when food product, 
raw ingredients, or additives are imported, the national border 
quarantine inspection agency would register the item according to its 
category and conduct a hygiene safety test.191 Such reading of the law 
suggests that the State is open to trade and thus positive about meeting 
international food safety standards. 
Market participation at the grassroots level warrants careful study, 
as it is where the issues of food security and problems of food safety 
cross boundaries in North Korea. While the 1948 Constitution 
recognized and permitted private property and private enterprises, 
these ideas were abolished once the juche ideology was established in 
1972.192 In this respect, 1972 was the year that marked North Korea 
closing off private market participation.193 Three decades later, 
however, the 1998 Constitution formally recognized private economic 
activities, and this leeway was also granted to the sphere of foreign 
trade.194 The constitutional amendments allowed collective 
organizations to conduct foreign trade, and one of the most notable 
features was that citizens now had freedom of movement.195 Between 
1992 and 1998, North Korea underwent massive starvation that many 
feared would endanger the survival of the state.196 Death rates soared, 
and given the sociopolitical circumstance, it may have been a realistic 
choice to legitimize movement of the people, who were moving in 
search of food and economic opportunities.197 The state-led rationing 
system failed as the state-led planned economy system collapsed from 
1994 to 1998.198 
Today, there are almost four hundred legal markets,199 and private 
individuals are allowed to participate in the economy. In 2009, the 
190 Hui, supra note 72, at 2. 
191 Korean National Police University Research Business Foundation, supra note 34, at 
101. 
192 Zook, supra note 32, at 139. 
193 See id. 
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constitution was revised to stipulate that economic development would 
be led by the State.200 The State’s food rationing system had already 
halted in the mid-90s, and private individuals had to engage in 
economic activities.201 This was particularly true in the way the private 
food distribution channels were developed throughout the country, 
focusing around Pyongyang, Haeju, and Hweryung.202 Family-made 
food was increasingly making it into the markets as individuals started 
making imitation meat, sausages, sweets, and cookies.203 
With all this, where is North Korea heading? The fact alone that the 
concepts of “rule of man,” “rule of law,” and “food safety regime” are 
so grand and abstract implies that there is open room to interpret North 
Korea’s situation.204 While there certainly is reform taking place in 
different areas of the country, there may be those who argue that 
predicting possible paradigm shifts is fruitless because it is entirely 
uncontrollable. Nevertheless, this Article purports that it is possible to 
predict changes and eventual shifts in paradigms if we trace scattered 
and sporadic developments in North Korea’s food safety regime. 
III 
ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN THE FOOD SAFETY REGIME 
This Article presumes that important changes will take place in 
North Korea’s food safety regime. It purports that paradigm shifts will 
occur in people as the society continues to evolve and develop. This is 
not merely because the country has a new ruler but rather because 
history repeats itself, and North Korea has shown similar 
characteristics of a food safety regime that once existed in China, as the 
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indeed incremental and slight, but they are happening via the opening 
up of borders, government reforms, and increased public participation. 
By discerning different elements, this Article drew attention to the 
internal movements that continue to mold the food safety regime. A 
comprehensive review would allow analysts to reduce general 
speculation on paradigm shifts. At the same time, it has become 
increasingly clear that the transitioning process to a rule-of-law system 
plays an integral part in shaping how the future regime will look. A 
food safety regime is a set of principles, ideas, and notions, and ruling 
out the role of the law here would reduce this Article to a piecemeal 
study. 
The preceding discussions of the country’s experiences and law 
reforms suggest that North Korea’s food safety regime has a long way 
to go to becoming a fully matured “rule-of-law” governance system. 
However, in turning to the question of what the above discussion may 
imply for social development, there may be some interesting notes. 
Given that China moved slowly away from a rule-of-man system into 
more of a rule-of-law system in less than two decades, we may logically 
conclude that the two systems of rule-of-man and rule-of-law may not 
be mutually exclusive to each other. Instead, the transitioning process 
is a continuum,206 as shown in China’s case, in which we can say that, 
as a general trend, there may be continued Kim deification, but 
predictability in the law may even coexist. 
It is unlikely that there will be a significant change in deification and 
its persistence over the juche ideology for strong political reasons. 
Likewise, it would be reasonable to assume that the government would 
try to maintain its control of land and agricultural production. 
A. Movement to a Comprehensive Food Safety Law
Reflecting on the experience China had with its Food Safety Law 
entering into force, it would be reasonable to predict that changes may 
occur when the public calls for it. In China, the initial attempt to replace 
the Food Hygiene Law with a new comprehensive Food Safety Law 
was made in 2003, when it was placed on the agenda at the National 
People’s Congress.207 However, it was not until four years later that a 
206 The debate on whether the rule of man and the rule of law are mutually exclusive of 
each other and whether they can coexist is an interesting one. However, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper, and this author will be covering this debate within the context of food 
safety in a separate study. 
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white paper on food safety was prepared by the State Council.208 It was 
only by the end of 2007 when the first version of the food safety law 
was read, but when public interest in food safety spiked after the 
melamine crisis at the end of the year, the next reading was completed 
within five months, and the 2009 Food Safety Law went into effect by 
2009.209 The implementing regulations from thereon were completed a 
month after the law became effective.210 Such progressive revision was 
not only made in a timely manner but it also covered areas in which the 
public demanded reinforcement of risk prevention. While North Korea 
currently has its own version of the Food Hygiene Law that was most 
recently amended in 2013, it is still rather short with thirty-two 
provisions that, when read alone, have an excessively broad application 
due to their vagueness.211 
Nevertheless, North Korea is still actively revisiting its laws where 
necessary. According to a study of 140 laws and ordinances listed in 
North Korea’s code book, all laws are classifiable into sixteen different 
categories.212 Among them are twenty-three laws related to agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries.213 In the 2012 Code, seventy-five divisional 
laws were newly enforced.214 In 2016, a total of 31 laws were newly 
enforced and 109 were amended.215 The River Act was revised and 
supplemented in 2013 to require timely digging of river bottoms when 
the water level rises. Water plants and garbage must be cleared to allow 
clear and clean water to flow at all times (Article 18 Protection and 
Maintenance of River Facilities).216 
Some speculate that North Korea will continue to revise its 
environmental regulations to the extent it overlaps with food safety 
issues. For example, the Environmental Protection Act was enacted on 
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2013 and 2014.217 The Environmental Protection Act, Chapter 3, 
contains overarching requirements on the prevention of environmental 
pollution, Air Pollution Control Law, and the Daedong River Pollution 
Prevention Law.218 In the 2013 Amendment, Article 1 established the 
purpose of the Act (to protect the natural environment to constantly 
improve nature), and revisions were made to the selection of nature 
reserves and special protection zones (Article 11), forests and green 
areas (Article 17), purification of wastewater (Article 24), pollution 
from ships (Article 27), environmental restoration of destroyed 
grounds related to development of underground resources (Article 29), 
and compensation for damages resulting from environmental 
destruction (Article 52).219 In the 2014 Amendment, a number of 
improvements were made, including an elaborate purpose clause. It 
now states that the Act aims “to preserve the natural environment and 
to constantly improve the nature” with the purpose to protect the 
people’s health and provide them with cultural and hygienic living and 
working conditions.”220 Article 24 also introduced the requirement of 
recycling urban waste.221 
There have been developments in specific food-related acts as well. 
Among others, the Salt Act was adopted by the Supreme People’s 
Assembly Standing Committee, Decree No. 255, on December 10, 
2014.222 According to Article 1 of the Act, the purpose of the Salt Act 
is to establish salt fields and build strict rules and orders for salt 
production and supply in order to guarantee and appropriately meet salt 
demand and improve the people’s living standards.223 The Salt Act also 
includes provisions related to the principle of constructing salt fields 
(Article 4), the principle of salt production (Article 4), the principle of 
supply and use of salt (Article 5), the principles of strengthening 
research and technical training for talented people (Article 6), and 
international cooperation (Article 7).224 Article 28 further requires strict 
quality inspection for salt produced. Article 22 (planning of salt 
production) and Article 34 (planning of salt demand) stipulate the 
217 Id. at 104. 
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produce Daedong River Beer. 
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State’s control of the planning, and any salt supplier must supply 
according to the plan and the salt supply agreement.225 
In considering the scope of a potential food safety law in the country, 
it is important to note that North Korea remains focused on the 
production of basic foods and children’s food products, such as corn, 
barley, soybeans, wheat, and soy sauce made from corn and 
soybeans.226 Other food, such as snacks, are considered to be important 
as well and have often been rationed on important national holidays.227 
However, since the 1990s, as the food ration system ended, private 
individuals have also begun selling these food products. As mentioned 
earlier, in marketplaces that exist around North Korea today, it is easy 
to see all kinds of food products, beverages, and liquors that have been 
homemade. It is now found that the variety and quantity of these 
homemade food products have surpassed those produced by the 
State.228 Food safety law will cover all production activities,229 which 
may include not only the State but also private activities for this reason. 
Taking into consideration the developments being made in different 
aspects by both the State and the public, it would be reasonable to 
predict comprehensive food safety law in the future. 
B. Reforms in the Governance Structure
Reforms in the governance structure have increasingly been 
evaluated as a tendency to balance “government efficiency” against 
“individual [private] rights when it comes to a society transitioning into 
a rule of law society.”230 At one end, this results in strengthened state 
control. At the other end, this is a movement to reconfigure the 
governance system with increased predictability and transparency. 
Indeed, the State has placed more focus on controlling distribution 
means.231 Article 44 (distribution of settlement of farms) newly 
specified that the distribution method be based on distribution in kind 
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supplemented by cash distribution. Prior to 2012, Article 48 
(Agricultural Products) stipulated that agricultural products, such as 
seeds, food, and livestock, must be purchased by the State with the 
exception of a limited amount to be used for planting, food, and 
livestock feed. In the 2012 revision, however, Article 48 was rewritten 
to include a product purchasing plan and to keep the remaining product 
for distribution for farmers, seeds, livestock feed, and other 
situations.232 However, as part of its efforts to increase predictability 
and transparency and to tackle inconsistencies among different laws, 
the Republican Legislation Act was adopted in 2012. From Kim Jong 
Un’s perspective, ensuring that the law serves its intended purposes 
may be a priority. It is important to clarify the hierarchy, validity, and 
scope of all different laws and regulations.233 
At the same time, further centralization of government agencies and 
personnel in charge is likely to take place. This pattern is neither new 
nor unique in North Korea from the perspective of a food safety 
scholar, as agencies merging to create one monitoring agency has been 
a trend in many other parts of the world as well.234 In an ideal world, a 
grouping of agencies and shared jurisdictions would mean 
collaboration and reinforcement of each other’s roles in the system as 
a whole. Simply put, multiple ministries, departments, and bureaus 
working on an identical task may raise hopes for collaborative 
enforcement, implementation, and supervision of rules and laws. In 
reality, however, a common agency coordination problem arises in 
which people are left with confusion due to a lack of clear jurisdictional 
boundaries. This was also one of the identified reasons for the 
melamine crisis in China, and there has been a constant movement 
toward centralization of overlapping agencies.235 
This is primarily because jurisdictional overlap comes at a cost. It 
results in under-regulation or lack of regulation at the implementation 
stage for reasons that include (1) a lack of incentive to motivate a single 
agency to take a heavier responsibility because it does not get blamed 
for failing to take actions and (2) an inability to fully understand the 
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regulatory scheme as a whole.236 Jurisdictional boundaries are fuzzy 
and ambiguous to an extent that it is difficult to pinpoint the origin of 
a food safety problem. To make matters worse, the cost of having 
ambiguous jurisdictional boundaries does not stop there, as 
“duplicative monitoring and enforcement costs” continue to 
accumulate with time.237 While it may take time to centralize agencies, 
as this often comes after a public outcry on food safety, it would be 
important to take a holistic point of view for further centralization and 
distinguish agencies based on their primary and secondary roles. As 
Lee wrote, “[E]ach regulatory agency’s agenda should be guided by a 
narrowly defined core mission, which often covers only a subset of the 
agency’s collective statutory duties.”238 This idea is plausible if we 
consider that agencies are a part of the entire system under the 
supervision of the Korean Workers Party. Political power and 
dominance when determining structures in regulatory policy can be 
harmful.239 Scholars argue that it would be desirable for agencies to 
collaborate, especially when doing so maximizes “the purported 
strengths of shared regulatory space.”240 Understanding such strengths 
when discussing standard reform procedures is critical.241 
C. Growing Public Participation and Market Economy
Scholarship suggests that China’s introduction of “market economic 
development” induced a rule-of-law governance system.242 Free 
markets returned as a forum for private participation in the late 
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1970s.243 In 1977, they made an appearance in the countryside and 
emerged in the cities two years later.244 Similar results may be seen in 
North Korea. In fact, this has already been witnessed. 
The idea that China’s rule-of-law developmental stage stemmed 
from a market economy originates from the East Asian development 
model.245 According to the model, the state initiates a state-led 
economic reform by recognizing limited civil law rights, such as the 
right to enter contracts and consumer rights.246 While the state does not 
grant people political rights or collective rights, it does invest in 
education and institutional developments.247 Once this takes place, the 
government takes a strong stance in defending its political power. 
However, the government would have greater difficulty in controlling 
the people as they would be more educated, well informed, and able to 
take steps toward calling for a rule of law.248 In North Korea, decision-
making processes may become increasingly driven by financial gains 
and profits.249 
It is possible to see this movement as early as the 1992 Constitution. 
Article 37 of the 1992 Constitution then stated that “[t]he State shall 
encourage institutions, enterprises, and organizations in our country to 
joint ventures and cooperation of enterprise with foreign corporations 
and individuals.”250 In what may seem like a liberal move aimed at 
economic development, the constitutional amendments encouraged 
investment and cooperation with foreign entities. However, in 1998, 
the Article was amended to limit such activity to “a special economic 
zone.”251 
As the governing law for all foreign investments in the country, the 
Foreign Investment Law is understood to principally govern the Rajin-
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Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone.252 A careful read of the 
Foreign Investment Law also backs the State’s intention to carefully 
select the Zone. In scholarship, the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and 
Trade Zone area is regarded as a testing ground for the State to 
experiment with socialist capitalism while maintaining caution against 
recognition of progressive economic and legal reforms.253 It is, simply 
put, the experimental ground for conflicts between the juche and the 
capitalist systems. The implementing regulations additionally stipulate 
that any sale of goods is to be supervised and managed by the respective 
administrative authority.254 Thus, the government is increasing its 
control and oversight over emerging forms of trade and investment 
arrangements. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article did not aim to mechanically predict the number of years 
the State needed to mature into a society with a fully functioning food 
safety governance system. Rather, it aimed to provide a general review 
of the North Korean food safety situation and its governance structure, 
and then anticipate changes to occur as the country becomes subject to 
the internal dynamics within the food safety regime. It becomes 
possible to argue that blindly insisting on equal treatment and absolute 
transparency might not be ideal or feasible in the North Korean political 
framework; questions such as whether a rule of law is a prerequisite to 
safe food must also be addressed in a separate sequel piece of study. 
And, if so, determining what relationship these two concepts have 
would also be an important study particularly because the food safety 
regime in North Korea is under-studied and under-discussed. Indeed, 
further research may find that an identified pattern between the two 
concepts does not even exist. This Article aimed to lay the groundwork 
for all these following questions and to find that there certainly is a 
positive struggle and tension between food safety and the rule of law. 
In further understanding changes in the food safety regime, the 
discussion of different definitions of rule of law and rule of man would 
be important. 
Having looked into some of the legal reforms that have taken place 
in the past few decades, it most likely seems that the juxtaposition of 
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food safety and food safety law will slowly transfer the country to a 
rule of law in the food safety regime. Kim Jong Un is often compared 
to his father and his grandfather and was in a politically fragile state 
when he became leader. In actively pursuing and ensuring stability, it 
is often perceived that he focuses on improving the legal framework 
and clarifying the relationships among different bodies of law to ensure 
enforcement.255 This will most likely continue as the process of 
building predictability, stability, and transparency in drafting and 
enforcing laws is recognized as the engine behind certain societal 
developments. This, in turn, will also result in bringing in paradigm 
shifts, including food safety regimes as well. This is what China tells 
us based on its past experience and what it continues to witness 
today.256 
What does it mean to have safe food? It would be irresponsible to 
leave this question unanswered, and a persistent observation of the 
child playing with building blocks will allow us to discover the 
implications of a nonarbitrary and stable food safety system. Creating 
administrative procedures that comply with the law, developing 
transparent law and decision-making processes, opening up both 
domestically and internationally, and raising awareness are all 
important tasks that the State should look into studying. While 
deification of the Kim family will most likely continue as a primary 
political objective, it is still likely that the government will delve into 
problems of structural and societal segmentation and raise public 
participation in the near future as it continues to realize that a well-
established and a stable legal food safety policy is critical. It will be 
very difficult for the government to ignore when food safety accidents 
occur and when people become increasingly aware of regulatory 
failures. 
255 Korean National Police University Research Business Foundation, supra note 34, at 
116–17. 
256 See Snyder & Kim, supra note 180. 
